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The Nature of Social Human Rights Treaties and
Standard-Setting WTO Treaties: A Question of Hierarchy?
Hans Morten Haugen*
Abstract. Social human rights are not held to belong to the category of jus cogens
norms. At the same time these human rights protect vital matters, such as the right to
adequate food, which obviously has a relationship to the right to life. On the other hand,
the annexes to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement, which are binding on
all WTO member States, has implied a shift from the old General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs (GATT) to the WTO, from pure contractual treaties to more standard-
setting treaties. The article seeks to analyse if the obligations erga omnes and the concept
of ‘multilateral obligations’ are applicable to distinguish between human rights treaties on
the one hand and WTO agreements on the other. The background of the analysis is also
the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) Study Group on fragmentation of
international law, ﬁnalised in 2006. The article ﬁnds that there is still uncertainty regard-
ing the exact meaning of the term ‘multilateral obligations’. Hence, other concepts such
as ‘absolute obligations’ might be preferred in order to characterise human rights treaties,
and hence implicitly acknowledge that treaties that protect vital matters may prevail over
other treaties, based on the interests which are to be protected.
1. Introduction
Traditionally, there has been a ﬁrmly held conviction that with the exception of
jus cogens norms and the principle of lex superior, there is no hierarchy between
treaties of international law. To this list can be added treaty provisions which are
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also held to be customary law, and which are generally held to stand above those
treaty provisions which are not customary law.
The article1 seeks to identify the relevance of two other legal approaches which
have been introduced for the purpose of explaining the nature of obligations under
international law. These are obligations erga omnes and multilateral obligations.
Obligations erga omnes imply that all States have a legal interest in a State’s
compliance. Multilateral obligations imply that treaties cannot be amended. The
obligations erga omnes principle is of a more procedural nature, but is recognised
by the ICJ, however, in a rather inconsistent manner.2 The multilateral obliga-
tions approach is of a more substantive nature, but is only recently introduced in
the academic literature, as well as by the ILC.
The obligations erga omnes principle and multilateral obligations approach are
different from jus cogens norms, which is a more restrictive category.3 The exis-
tence of jus cogens norms implies that treaties which are in conﬂict with such a
norm become void.4
Unlike jus cogens, it is more difﬁcult to conclude that treaties which are giving
rise to obligations erga omnes or multilateral obligations have a weight which ele-
vates them above other treaties which do not give rise to such obligations.
Obligations erga omnes and multilateral obligations can, nevertheless, be consid-
ered in the context of interpreting treaties as it is implicitly recognised that
treaties in which they are found are of a particular nature that distinguishes these
treaties from other treaties.
First, the requirements for analysing treaty relationship and possible treaty
conﬂicts will be presented. Second, the existing principles of solving conﬂicts
between treaties will be analysed, particularly the relationship between the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter
‘Covenant’). The main part of the article is an analysis of obligations erga omnes
and multilateral obligations, ﬁrst on a principal level. Then, the legal consequences
1) The article is based on Chapter 11 of the author’s PhD thesis.
2) For an overview of the ICJ’s use of the term erga omnes, see C. J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga
Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) pp. 114, 115, terming its
use ‘inﬂationary’.
3) The difference between the two must not be overemphasised, as all jus cogens norms give rise to
obligations erga omnes, and that obligations erga omnes are derived from jus cogens. See B. Simma, ‘From
Bilateralism to Community Interest’, 250 Recueil des cours (1994–VI) (Hague Academy of International
Law and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, Boston, London, 1997) p. 300. There can, however,
be norms which only give rise to obligations erga omnes, not constituting jus cogens.
4) See Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Prohibition against slavery,
torture, aggression, crimes against humanity, apartheid crimes and racial discrimination crimes are gen-
erally considered to belong to jus cogens norms. The right of self-determination falls within the scope of
the prohibition against aggression.
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of these ﬁndings will be applied in the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement
and the Covenant in order to analyse which of the treaties will prevail over the
other treaty in a given situation of treaty conﬂict.
2. Requirements for Analysing Treaty Relationship and Possible 
Treaty Conflict
The requirement for a conﬂict to be established is that there is overlap between the
provisions in the two treaties both ratione materiae (same subject matter; see 
Article 30(2) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), ratione personae (same
State parties; see Article 30(3) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) and ratione
temporis (same time). Of particular relevance is the overlap regarding subject matter.
Before initiating any analysis on the relationsip between the Covenant and
TRIPS, there must be an assessment whether provisions of the two treaties in fact
relate to the same subject matter.5 The ﬁnal report by Koskenniemmi on fragmen-
tation of international law emphasises that the same subject matter cannot be
the only criteria to establish a basis for analysing the relationship between two
treaties,6 but the ‘same subject matter’ test will nevertheless be applied. If it is
found that the relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the Covenant
simply relate to different subject matter, the relevant provisions of the Vienna
Convention do not apply.
TRIPS regulates intellectual property protection, including patent protection for
new technical knowledge applied on genetic resources. The Covenant regulates
human rights protection, including means to ensure improved methods of produc-
tion of food as well as access to the food, which is essential for the enjoyment of
the right to food, in Article 11(2). Moreover, Article 15(1) recognises the right of
everyone to enjoy the beneﬁts of scientiﬁc progress–including the results of food
research–and its applications, and the right of the inventor to enjoy the moral and
material interests resulting from his scientiﬁc production, potentially including food
production. Common for these provisions is that they relate to ‘improved food’.
While the two treaties relate to the subject matter ‘improved food’, the treaties
regulate the subject matter differently. In the context of TRIPS, the most important
5) On the distinction between the provisions of a treaty and the treaty as such, see R. Wolfrum and
N. Matz, Conﬂicts in International Environmental Law, Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und
Völkerrecht Band 164 (Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 2003) pp. 149, 150.
6) International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difﬁculties Arising from the
Diversiﬁcation and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International Law
Commission–Finalised by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, prepared for the 58th session of the
International Law Commission (1 May–9 June and 3 July–11 August 2006), paras. 21–23, 117, 254. In
this report, Koskenniemi ﬁnds that relationships between treaties are addressed more appropriately by
the concept of ‘treaty regimes’.
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aspect of the subject matter is the efforts preceeding the improved food, namely
the new technical knowledge applied on genetic resources, giving rise to rights in
accordance with Articles 27 and 28 of TRIPS.7
In the context of the Covenant, the most important aspect of the subject mat-
ter is the efforts following from the improved food, namely whether and how
such food is made available in a way that improves the right to food, particularly
for the most food insecure and vulnerable. The Covenant thus regulates how
food is made available at sufﬁcient quantities and at affordable prices.
More generally, the phrase ‘same subject matter’ can also refer to the issues that
are regulated by the treaties, and the means or measures by which these issues are
regulated. Food production is regulated in both treaties.
It seems therefore reasonable to conclude that while there are obvious differ-
ences between the subject matter in the human rights system (human beings)
and the patent and plant variety protection system (protectable inventions or
plant varieties), the rights recognised in the two systems both relate to physical
food or improved food. The treaties do not need to regulate this subject matter
in an identical way.8 While it is not correct to state that the subject matter of the
two systems is the same, the two treaties relate to the same subject matter. Both
the right to food and the relevant patent and plant variety protection could, in
effect, depend upon the effective control over this improved food. Therefore, the
‘same subject matter’ requirement must be considered to be met.
3. Solving Conflict Between Treaties if Harmonious Interpretation 
is not Possible
A brief analysis of the applicability of the established principles for solving
conﬂicts will be undertaken. These are lex superior, lex posterior and lex specialis.9
7) Said in more abstract terms with particular relevance for biotechnological inventions relating to
food plants, intellectual property rights are constituted through applying an immaterial subject (knowl-
edge) to a material object. This knowledge must relate to the genetic composition of the plant (geno-
type), and the protection will apply to all physical plants containing this genetic composition
(phenotype). TRIPS regulates rights derived from specific and applicable knowledge or intellectual
efforts. The right extends to the objects to which this knowledge or intellectual effort is related, imply-
ing that the right holder determines others’ access to the those products falling within the exclusive rights
exercised in accordance with the granted patent based on the patent claims.
8) See J. Pauwelyn, Conﬂict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other
Rules of International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) pp. 364, 365, based on the
fact that conﬂict can only be identiﬁed if there is overlap between treaties ratione materiae, as well as
ratione temporis and ratione personae.
9) A fourth category of conﬂict, described by Pauwelyn, ibid., pp. 418-436, is a situation in which
both norms are ‘equal’. He ﬁnds (at p. 434) that the only long-term solution is to “renegotiate either
norm as to end the conﬂict.” This fourth category will not be considered in this article.
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The analysis focuses on the main theme of this article, the relationship between
the Covenant and TRIPS, identifying which of the two treaties is to prevail in
situations of conﬂict.
Lex superior: This principle applies primarily when distinguishing between a
jus cogens norm and other norms under international law. A treaty is void if one
of its provisions conﬂicts with a jus cogens norm.
Of particular relevance in the context of jus cogens norms is whether the
human rights recognised by the Covenant can also give rise to jus cogens norms.
As racial discrimination is a jus cogens norm, the prohibition of discrimination
based on race under Article 2(2) can be considered as constituting a jus cogens
norm. Also the right of self- determination, as recognised in Article 1, is gener-
ally accepted as a jus cogens norm, at least those elements of self-determination
which relate to breaches of territorial integrity.
With regard to the rights analysed in this article, the initial observation is that
catalogues of jus cogens norms do not include social human rights, such as the
right to food. In principle, therefore, jus cogens norms do not apply to the human
rights recognised in Part III of the Covenant. Conversely, elements of these rights
might be included in other jus cogens norms.10 There is, however, a high thresh-
old for identifying certain treaty provisions as jus cogens norms, and the right to
food is not held to represent a jus cogens norm.
In the context of lex superior, there is one other situation that must be clari-
ﬁed. Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) reads:
In the event of a conﬂict between the obligation of the Member of the United Nations
under the present Charter, and their obligations under any other international agree-
ment, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
The problem with this provision is that it is difﬁcult to identify the speciﬁc obli-
gations imposed by the Charter. It is not evident what the phrase “obligations
under the present Charter” truly implies.11 It will be analysed whether this
10) As an example, the right to self-determination, which has a jus cogens nature primarily with regard
to the political dimensions of the right to self-determination, can be relevant. Article 1(2) includes a pro-
hibition against deprivation of means of subsistence. As food is a means of subsistence, any treaty which
allows for the deliberate deprivation of capacities to produce food, through interference in the propaga-
tion of plants, contamination or other means, can be found to be void as it violates the right to self-deter-
mination. S. Skogly, International Council on Human Rights Policy, Extra-National Obligations Towards
Economic and Social Rights (2002), p. 22, <www.ichrp.org/ac/excerpts/92.doc>, visited on 2 June 2006,
ﬁnds that all States are “under an obligation not to deliberately starve people by removing their food.”
To remove food must be seen as a deprivation of means of subsistence.
11) In Lockerbie, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 15, para. 39, the ICJ found that “in accordance with Article 103
of the Charter, the obligations of the Parties in that respect prevail over their obligations under any other
international agreement . . .” emphasis added, see also p. 14, para. 37. In the same paragraph, the ICJ con-
ﬁrmed that UN members “are obliged to accept and carry out the decision of the Security Council in
accordance with Article 25 of the Charter.”
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provision implies that every provision in the Charter which can be understood
to constitute an obligation is above any other non-UN provision, independent
of the level of generality of both the provision in the Charter and of the provi-
sion in a non-UN treaty.
The starting point is the explicit recognition of human rights in the UN
Charter. Respect for human rights is recognised in Articles 1(3) and 55(c) of the
UN Charter.12 Human rights are also referred to in Article 13(1)(b), in which the
General Assembly is mandated to initiate studies and make recommendations
for the purpose of assisting in the realisation of human rights, as well as in
Articles 62(2) and 68, in which the Economic and Social Council is mandated,
respectively, to make recommendations and to set up commissions for the pro-
motion of human rights.
Based on both the explicit recognition of human rights in the Charter itself,
as well as the subsequent adoption of conventions, commissions and other mech-
anisms, based on Articles 13(1)(b) and 68, it must be asked whether obligations
relating to human rights, as derived from the UN Charter, shall always prevail in
situations of conﬂict with obligations under other international agreements.
This recognition of human rights in the ‘world constitution’ is conﬁrmed by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).13 There are no rulings by any international
court based on an application of Article 103 of the UN Charter in a dispute between
human rights and other international norms not recognised by the Charter.
There can be no doubt that human rights per se are explicitly recognised in
the Charter, and that the members of the UN shall work toward the promotion
and observance of as well as the respect for human rights. At the same time, the
paragraphs which address human rights also address the wider context of solving
problems on a national and international level. This implies that treaties provid-
ing for international economic cooperation, as well as treaties promoting and
protecting economic, social and cultural rights, are equally included.
Based on the wording of the Charter, it must be asked whether this recognition
of human rights merely implies that the UN system has a mandate relating to pro-
motion of human rights, or whether it also implies that substantial obligations on
States are imposed by the UN Charter. If one chooses the latter understanding,
12) Article 55 of the Charter reads “the United Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress
and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international
cultural and educational co- operation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all with-
out distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”
13) Namibia (South West Africa), ICJ Reports 1971, p. 46, para. 92.
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individual and speciﬁc rights, both those generally recognised at the time of the
drafting of the Charter and those which have been subsequently recognised are
within the scope of the UN Charter. If all human rights are explicitly recognised
as falling within the scope of the UN Charter, and as Article 103 states that obli-
gations under the Charter shall prevail over obligations of any other international
agreement, this point is important.
The provisions of the UN Charter addressing human rights refer speciﬁcally
to the United Nations and its bodies (General Assembly and Economic and
Social Council). The fact that there are no references to the obligation of States
per se to promote and respect human rights cannot be interpreted to imply that
the United Nations member States are under no obligation with regard to human
rights. Two authors of a widely recognised book in international law hold that
the Charter also constitutes legal obligations for States, but they acknowledge
that there are several scholars who disagree with this.14
As an argument against ﬁnding that the Charter imposes substantial obliga-
tions upon States, it must be emphasised that the UN Charter primarily
addresses the UN system. At the same time, it is reasonable to state that in order
for the United Nations to promote human rights, which is stated as one of its
purposes, the States are under an obligation to observe this purpose in their own
practice, and work toward the fulﬁlment of this purpose in the context of the
United Nations.
Concerning the legal effect of the Charter and its provisions relating to human
rights, the national courts have “differed markedly in their conclusions.”15 Some
courts’ decisions made in 1947 considered that the provisions of the Charter are
relevant in the sense that they form part of the public policy of the State as a sig-
natory of the Charter, even if the provisions of the Charter were not considered
to have binding effect.16
It is therefore found that there is no general agreement regarding the precise
nature of the human rights obligations imposed by the UN Charter. Moreover,
while the many references to human rights in the Charter should be noted, there
is no explicit indication that these should stand out from the other areas of coop-
eration that are mentioned in the Charter. At the same time, the fact that human
rights is recognised in Article 1(3) as one of the purposes of the UN must be
14) R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th edition (Longmann, London and
New York, 1992) p. 989, note 13.
15) Ibid., p. 990.
16) Ibid., p. 991. This is further elaborated upon: “The members of the United Nations are under at
least a moral–and, however imperfect, a legal–duty to use their best efforts, either by agreement or,
whenever possible, by enlightened action of their own judicial and other authorities, to act in support of
a crucial purpose of the Charter.” Ibid., p. 989.
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acknowledged. Hence, it seems that “[t]he UN Charter does not resolve the
question of hierarchy of law, or put differently, whether human rights law has
primacy over other domains of international law.”17
One example will be provided. A potential consequence of applying Article 103
without limitations is that Article 55(a), stating, inter alia, that the United
Nations shall promote full employment, implies that international treaties which
address employment issues, directly or indirectly, should prevail over all other
agreements. Several of the economic agreements which States have entered into
might negatively affect this obligation to promote full employment–at least in
the short-term.18 There is no doubt that these economic agreements are generally
observed and respected–despite the fact that obligations relating to full employ-
ment of the Charter can be negatively affected.
Moreover, the Charter is first and foremost a constitution of the United
Nations, establishing the UN as the dominant institution of all nations,
identifying the organisation and purposes of the UN. Furthermore, the wording
of the Charter falls short of meeting the requirements that human rights treaties
must fulfil, namely those establishing clear corresponding obligations. The
Charter does not contain any substantive obligations regarding human
rights, except for the provisions relating to ‘studies’ and ‘commissions’ within
the UN in Articles 13(1)(b), 62(2) and 68. The terms applied in Articles 1(3)
and 55 (‘promote’, ‘respect’ and ‘observe’, the latter only applied in Article 55(c))
are relatively weak. These provisions, however, conﬁrm that the UN system has
a mandate relating to the promotion of human rights, which implies that
UN member States are under an obligation to cooperate for this purpose.
Finally, while there is agreement that a distinction can be made between human
rights giving rise to jus cogens norms on the one hand and ‘ordinary’ human
rights on the other,19 there is nothing in the UN Charter which makes any dis-
tinction between human rights. In conclusion, it is therefore fair to state that the
UN Charter is difficult to apply for solving potential conflicts between a
UN human rights treaty and a WTO agreement.
17) See J. E. Alvarez, ‘How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade Regime’,
2:1 Widener Law Symposium Journal (2001) p. 9.
18) The WTO Agreement, bilateral trade agreements and agreements on economic restructuring are
examples.
19) G. Marceau, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights’, 13 European Journal of International
Law (2002) p. 798, says that the understanding that Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter cover “all
human rights (and not only jus cogens) (. . .) is quite expansive.” She refers to a report on WTO and
human rights by the Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH).
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Lex posterior : The lex posterior principle states that the most recent expression
of State obligations in the form of a treaty (‘legislative intent’)20 prevails over pre-
vious treaties. Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties regu-
lates such situations. In addition to the requirement that the treaties must relate
to the same subject matter (ratione materiae),21 there are two other basic precon-
ditions which must be fulﬁlled for Article 30 to apply: the requirement that the
treaties must be successive and the requirement that the the treaties must apply to
the same treaty parties (ratione personae).
The main rule is that in application of successive treaties relating to the same
subject matter, the treaty that has been adopted more recently shall prevail in a
situation of conﬂict between the treaties. It was found that the two treaties stud-
ied do relate to the same subject matter. The two treaties, however, cannot be
considered to be successive, based on an understanding of the term successive:
‘successive’ means “following one another” or “following closely.”22 As the two
treaties are not successive, the lex posterior principle does not apply. It is therefore
found that the lex posterior principle does not apply in solving potential conﬂicts
between the Covenant and TRIPS.
Lex specialis: This principle is not recognised in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, nor is it found in other international treaties. The lex specialis
principle is, however, generally considered to be the third principle for determin-
ing which treaty prevails in a situation of conﬂict between treaties. The ICJ has
applied the lex specialis principle.23 The principle is also included in the
International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility.24 Article 55
of the Draft Articles reads:
These articles does not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the exis-
tence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the inter-
national responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of international law.
20) The ‘legislative intent’ is most appropriately expressed at the time of the adoption of the treaty.
See UN Conference on the Law of Treaties,Vol. II: Second Session, Vienna, 9 April–22 May 1969, Ofﬁcial
Records (1970), p. 253, where the expert consultant from the ILC Sir Humphrey Waldock says “that
intention, as expressed in the later instrument, should therefore be taken as intended to prevail over the
intention expressed in the earlier instrument. That being so, it was inevitable that the date of adoption
should be the relevant one.”
21) Pauwelyn, supra note 8, p. 364: “If there is a conﬂict, the two treaties necessarily relate to the same
subject matter.”
22) Oxford New Dictionary of English (2001).
23) Ambieltos, ICJ Reports 1952, p. 44, and Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 76, para. 132.
24) The proposed Draft Articles of 2001, Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-third
Session (23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001), UN Doc. A/56/10, are the result of several decades
of discussion in the ILC. The Draft Articles do not have any legal status, but present a contemporary
understanding for the interpretation of public international law, written by some of the most prominent
experts of international law. The Draft Articles presented by the ILC deal only with remedies where an
internationally wrongful act has been committed.
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While Article 55 is speciﬁcally related to wrongful acts implying international
responsibility, the general principle is relevant. The principle of lex specialis in
public international law states that if all parties to a treaty conclude a more spe-
cialised treaty, the provisions of this latter treaty prevail over those of the more
general treaty, owing to the fact that they reﬂect more precisely the consent or
expression of will of the relevant State parties.25
It is not always obvious which of two treaties is more special of the two. Both
the subject matter under consideration, which legal rules that are best at solving
the matter, and which body is mandated to answer the question26 could impact
on the ﬁnding of which treaty is lex specialis.
The concrete application of the principle of lex specialis in order to solve con-
ﬂicts in the applicable law is still uncertain. The principle is recognised by the
WTO Secretariat, but this does not imply that such understanding is approved
by the WTO member States. The WTO Secretariat writes:
According to a widely held view in the CTE,27 trade measures that parties to a multilateral
environmental treaty have agreed, could be regarded as ‘lex specialis’, prevailing over WTO
provisions. They therefore ought not to give rise to legal problems in the WTO–even if the
agreed measures are inconsistent with WTO rules. However, this is not a deﬁnitive interpre-
tation, and numerous uncertainties remain.28
As stated by the WTO Secretariat, this is not a “deﬁnitive interpretation”, and a
view expressed by a secretariat cannot be considered as an authoritative interpre-
tation. Nevertheless, this acknowledgement of a widely held view by WTO
member States regarding environmental law as lex specialis in relation to WTO
law must be noted.
The lex specialis principle is generally recognised as one of three principles for
solving conﬂicts between two rules of international law. The concrete application
of this principle, however, is restricted by the limited jurisdiction of most inter-
national bodies which are mandated to monitor the implementation of and
adopt interpretations of treaties, as this mandate does not extend to apply to
other treaties. Therefore, this principle should be applied with caution.29 Only
25) Pauwelyn, supra note 8, p. 387.
26) Marceau, supra note 19, p. 761, states that it is “possible to envisage that a human rights forum
would reach a conclusion that a measure (that is also (part of ) a WTO measure) is inconsistent with a
human rights treaty, while the WTO adjudicating body would conclude that the same measure is con-
sistent with the WTO treaty.”
27) Committee on Trade and Environment.
28) WTO Secretariat brieﬁng: Environment: CTE Agenda Part 1: CTE on: Trade Rules, Environmental
Agreements and Disputes, <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/cte01_e.htm>, visited on 2 June 2006.
This brieﬁng does not have any legal status.
29) Pauwelyn, supra note 8, p. 438, concludes that only in case the lex posterior principle does not
apply there should be a recourse to lex specialis: “Even if an earlier treaty is lex specialis vis-à-vis the latest
expression [of State intent], this latest expression should prevail” , emphasis added.
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the ICJ is formally mandated to consider the relationship between two treaties
which are allegedly incompatible.
4. Obligations Erga Omnes
It has been found that the established means for solving conﬂicts between treaties
are not necessarily applicable in order to determine which of the two treaties, the
Covenant or TRIPS, is to prevail in a situation of conﬂict.
At the same time, treaties of a particular nature seeking to protect ‘vital matters’30
must be considered to have a certain weight. The analysis below will be on a prin-
cipal level, but the ﬁndings will also be applied speciﬁcally to the Covenant and
TRIPS. In other words, somewhere between the jus cogens norms–making void
all treaties which include provisions conﬂicting with such norms–and the basic
assumption of a lack of hierarchy in international law there might be certain
approaches which merit further attention.31
Four elements will be included in this section on obligations erga omnes. First,
an analysis of the requirements for establishing obligations erga omnes. Second,
an assessment of obligations erga omnes in the context of human rights, particu-
larly the right to food. Third, a similar assessment of obligations erga omnes in
the context of TRIPS, relating to the substantive standards established. Fourth,
the legal effects of identifying obligations erga omnes.
4.1. Requirements for Establishing Obligations Erga Omnes
The Barcelona Traction case introduced the principle of obligations erga omnes.32
This principle recognises obligations which are “owed to the international com-
munity as a whole, with the consequence that all States in the world have a legal
interest in the compliance with the obligation.”33 The ICJ included aggression,
genocide, slavery and racial discrimination as well as “the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person”34 as examples of obligations
30) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 2 (1966) p. 217, para. 13.
31) As will be clearer below, the term ‘principle’ is applied with regard to ‘obligations erga omnes’ as
this is an established legal principle, while the term ‘approach’ is applied with regard to ‘multilateral obli-
gations’ as this is not in the same manner an established legal principle.
32) ICJ Reports 1970, pp. 33, 34, paras. 33–35. In Barcelona Traction, which gave rise to the obligations
erga omnes, the issue considered by the ICJ was whether Belgium could bring a claim against Spain, com-
plaining on behalf of Belgian shareholders against general measures introduced by Spain against the
Barcelona Traction Company. The question (at para. 35) was: “Has a right of Belgium been violated on
account of its nationals’ having suffered infringements . . .” This was therefore an issue of diplomatic protec-
tion, in which the Belgian capacity to bring such a claim was dependent upon whether such a right existed.
33) Report by ILC Special Rapporteur James Crawford, A/CN.4/507, 2000, para. 106(a).
34) Barcelona Traction, supra note 32, p. 33, para. 34.
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erga omnes.35 While the act of aggression must be primarily considered as giving
rise to erga omnes obligations with regard to other States, the other obligations
give rise to obligations erga omnes that apply particularly to human beings.
Hence, a distinction can be made between obligations erga omnes which seek
to protect the interests of other States, and obligations erga omnes which seek to
protect human beings directly.36 Below, focus will be on those obligations erga
omnes which derive from the basic rights of the human person, and not those
obligations which seeks to protect the interests of States. In this context, it must
be emphasised that the same ICJ ruling which introduced the obligations erga
omnes principle also states that “the instruments which embody human rights do
not confer on States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such
rights irrespective of their nationality.”37 This premise only repeats the basic idea
of human rights protection, namely that it is the State which has human rights
obligations with respect to all persons within its jursidiction,38 and that these
obligations cannot be transferred to others.
Under which circumstances will the lack of observance and fulﬁlment of obli-
gations by one State give rise to a legal interest by the international community
of States? Until now, the practice of the ICJ or other international courts has
not established a firm principle regarding the seriousness of the disrespect of
the obligations. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that while the principle of
obligations erga omnes is generally accepted, the principle is not sufﬁciently spec-
iﬁed and clear.
Acknowledging this uncertainty, the present author ﬁnds that there are three
conditions which must be fulﬁlled for an obligation erga omnes to apply. First, a
State violates its legal obligations. Second, this disrespect of the obligation must
take place on a certain scale, in other words in a grave and systematic manner.
Third, the consequences of acting in disrespect with its legal obligation are of
such a nature that the international community of States has a legal interest in
ensuring compliance.39
35) In addition to obligations erga omnes, the International Law Commission has introduced another
set of obligations, namely obligations erga omnes partes, whose obligations extend only to the other par-
ties of an international treaty, often a regional treaty (‘group of States’). See Report of the International
Law Commission, supra note 24, pp. 320, 321. Another term is also applied, namely inter omnes partes.
See Simma, supra note 3, p. 338. He notes (at p. 370) that “the omnes, however, [is] limited in our pres-
ent context to the circle of the other contracting parties.” As obligations erga omnes are more recognised
in international law than obligations erga omnes partes, this analysis will relate to the former.
36) Simma, ibid, p. 319. See also I. D. Seidermann, Hierarchy in International Law: The Human Rights
Dimension (Intersentia, Hart, Antwerpen, Groningen, Oxford, 2001).
37) Barcelona Traction, supra note 32, p. 47, para. 94.
38) With the possible exception relating to economic rights for non-nationals in accordance with
Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
39) See Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-seventh Session (2 May–3 June and 11 July–5
August 2005), UN Doc. A/60/10, 2005, p. 225, para. 492: “[O]bligations erga omnes [are] related to the 
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The most interesting question for the purpose of this thesis is to identify if
obligations that fall outside of the scope of jus cogens norms, which is a restric-
tive category,40 can nevertheless give rise to obligations erga omnes. This will be
analysed below in the context of the human right to food as well as TRIPS.
4.2. Obligations Erga Omnes and Human Rights, Particularly the Right 
to Food
Are human rights which falls outside of jus cogens norms nevertheless within the
scope of obligations erga omnes?41 This question is very different from other cat-
egorisations between ‘fundamental’ and ‘ordinary’ human rights.42
For the purpose of this thesis it will be analysed whether obligations erga omnes
apply to the right to food. On the one hand, there can be no reason to claim that
opposability of the obligations to all States, in particular the right of every State to invoke their violation
as a basis for State responsibility.” See also Article 33(1) of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State
Responsibility: “The obligations of the responsible State set out in this Part may be owed to another
State, to several States, or to the international community as a whole, depending in particular on the char-
acter and content of the international obligation, and on the circumstances of the breach”, emphasis
added. Also Article 48 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility (‘invocation of responsibility by a
State other than an injured State’) is an obligation erga omes provision.
40) The understanding of obligations erga omnes is close to jus cogens norms, from which no deroga-
tion is permitted, is expressed in the Report by ILC Special Rapporteur James Crawford, supra note 33,
para. 106(a). See also Simma, supra note 3, p. 300. This view of what constitutes obligations erga omnes must
be questioned, and it is not in conformity with what other authors have written about obligations erga omnes.
See Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-second Session (1 May–9 June and 10 July–19 August
2000), UN Doc. A/55/10, p. 40, para. 122.
41) The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility had deleted the pre-
vious references to human rights in the earlier drafts. In Article 40(2)(e)(ii) of the 1996 draft, only
human rights were speciﬁed, and no other reference to a particular system of law is found. In its com-
mentary to Article 40(2)(e)(iii), the ILC stated: “The interests protected by such provisions are not allo-
catable to a particular State.” See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 2 (1985) p. 27,
para. 20. The 2001 Draft did not make any speciﬁc references in Articles 42 and 43 (replacing the pre-
vious Article 40). See Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 24, pp. 294–304. These
Draft Articles are based on obligations erga omnes (see Report of the International Law Commission, ibid.,
pp. 38–48), but the deletion might qualify the position that obligations derived from human rights are
the only categories of obligations over which all other States have a legal interest. The reference to human
rights was deleted in the ILC’s Fourth Report on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, presented for the
UN General Assembly in 2001, as “[i]t singled out human rights for special treatment in vague and
overly broad terms and in a way that conﬂicted or overlapped with other aspects of the deﬁnition.” See
Crawford et al., The ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Toward Completion of a Second
Reading’, 94 American Journal of International Law (2000) p. 666. The lack of explicit references to
human rights violations in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility has been criticised by Tomuschat,
‘General Course on Public International Law’, 281 Recueil des cours (1999–VI) (Hague Academy of
International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, Boston, London, 2001) p. 295.
42) See Austria v. Italy, 1961, Case 788/60, in 4 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights
(1961) p. 116, where the European Human Rights Court pointed to the “objective character of human
rights treaties, being designed rather to protect the fundamental rights of individual human beings from
infringements by any of the High Contracting Parties than to create subjective and reciprocal rights for
the High Contracting Parties themselves”, p. 140, emphasis added.
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the international community of States does not have a common legal interest to
bring an end to a situation in which there are serious violations of social human
rights under which a great number of people suffer. A situation in which seg-
ments of the population are directly or indirectly denied access to crucial human
rights such as food, so that the right to food is so insufﬁciently enjoyed to the
extent that thousands of lives are threathened, is a concern for all other States.
These are basic rights of the human person to which all States have a legal inter-
est in all other States’ consistent compliance.
On the other hand, it can be more difﬁcult to identify the responsibility of the
State for the existence of a serious situation of non-fulﬁlment of social human
rights. While a situation of widespread torture and disappearances is clearly
falling under a State’s responsibility, a situation of widespread hunger can be the
result of several factors, not all of them being under the State’s control. Therefore,
the acts of omission or acts of commission must be speciﬁcally identiﬁed when
the international community addresses a hunger situation in a State.
Therefore, it seems that obligations erga omnes arise in certain situations of
serious violations of economic, social and cultural rights. The legal interest of other
States in the fulﬁlment of obligations must be considered to be more substantial
in situations showing a serious lack of enjoyment of recognised human rights.
Moreover, the right to be free from hunger is the only substantial human right
recognised in the Covenant which is explicitly said to be ‘fundamental’.
Moreover, States should always observe all their human rights obligations when
implementing measures to promote certain human rights, and apply the principle
of ‘the most-favourable provision’.43 In addition to Article 4 of the Covenant, there
are other provisions of international human rights treaties. Article 60 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms states that:
Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the
human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any
High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party.
This Article refers to ‘any of the human rights under any other agreement’. The
European Convention per se does not extend to the right to food, but the formu-
lation must be interpreted to imply that Article 60 applies generally, and not only
to civil and political rights.
An author discussing the principle of obligations erga omnes reaches the same
conclusion. He admits that international judicial and lawmaking organs have not
43) On the most-favourable provision (the provision which gives the best protection to the human
being), see S. A. Sadat-Akhavi, Methods of Resolving Conﬂicts Between Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
Leiden and Boston, 2003) ch. 7.
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been able to fulﬁl the potential of such obligations due to reluctancy among the
States. He continues: “[T]he doctrine should not be undercut by any tendency
to segregate particular ‘basic’ or ‘fundamental’ rights from the full corpus of
rights existent under general international law.”44 Moreover, “it is inappropriate
to divide human rights norms into those which entail obligations erga omnes and
those which do not . . .”.45
The arguments that human rights is an issue belonging exclusively to the
domestic jurisdiction of States have been convincingly challenged, and presently
are generally not accepted. A situation in which social human rights are threat-
ened in one country challenges the international community to assist in enabling
the respective States to work toward the fulﬁlment of these human rights.
The speciﬁc nature of human rights treaties, which is substantially different
from most other treaties applicable in the relations between States, must be con-
sidered the main argument for considering basic human rights to impose obliga-
tions erga omnes. Not all aspects of the right to food must be considered to
impose obligations erga omnes, but primarily those related to the measures for the
distribution of food, in situations of an enduring food shortage.46
In this context, it is not considered fruitful to analyse the statement of an
author claiming that “most obligations in human rights treaties might be seen as
falling into the class of ‘integral’ obligations.”47 The basis for giving rise to obliga-
tions erga omnes is that the State has acted–or failed to act–in a manner resulting
in an appalling situation, implying that there is a gross and systematic failure by
the State to fulﬁl its obligations. Based on this principle, economic, social and cul-
tural human rights might also give rise to obligations erga omnes. The right to food
is an example of a human right which can give rise to obligations erga omnes.
4.3. Obligations Erga Omnes in the Context of WTO and TRIPS
It has been acknowledged that ordinary WTO obligations are not of such a kind
that all States have a legal interest in the compliance with these obligations. As
an example, the USA has stated:
The concept erga omnes is squarely at odds with the fundamentally bilateral nature of
WTO and GATT dispute settlement and with the notion that WTO disputes concern
44) Seiderman, supra note 36, p. 289.
45) Ibid, p. 124.
46) Moreover, when a government has asked the international community for assistance in times of
famine and starvation, the suffering people should expect to be provided with food. Furthermore, if the
State facing severe food shortage for its vulnerable population refuses to cooperate with the international
community in order to have food provided, this would most certainly constitute non-compliance with
the right to food.
47) Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’, 95
American Journal of International Law (2001) p. 549, emphasis added.
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nulliﬁcation and impairment of negotiated beneﬁts to a particular Member. WTO adju-
dicators are tasked with resolving disputes between speciﬁc complaining and defending
parties. Adjudicators may not, through improper importation of the concept erga omnes,
enforce WTO obligations on behalf on non-parties to a dispute.48
The interesting question is whether this observation that the dispute settlement
under WTO is of a ‘fundamentally bilateral nature’, is correct with regard to all
WTO agreements and in all situations. While WTO agreements prohibit unjus-
tiﬁed or arbitrary discrimination between goods, services and intellectual property
holders of domestic and foreign origin, these agreements are diverse, and TRIPS
is the most prominent example of a ‘standard-setting’ or ‘lawmaking’ treaty.49
The analysis will be based on three reports from the Appellate Body. Based on
these ﬁndings, an analysis speciﬁcally regarding TRIPS will be provided. It will
be analysed whether these examples imply obligations erga omnes.
First, it should be observed that a dispute settlement panel has accepted–
endorsed by the Appellate Body–that member States which are not major pro-
ducers of a particular product can also bring a trade dispute relating to this prod-
uct to the dispute settlement system as “any deviation [is likely] . . . to affect them,
directly or indirectly.”50 The Appellate Body did not ﬁnd that case law from the
Permanent Court of International Justice/ICJ establishes as a general rule that “a
complaining party must have a ‘legal interest’ in order to bring the case.”51 This
indicates that less-affected parties might also be found eligible to bring a case.
This principle has been extended as a result of the following: In US–Line Pipe,
a non-developing country (South Korea) successfully brought a claim against the
USA for its failure to treat developing countries differently from industrialised
countries under the Safeguard Agreement.52 In US–Section 211 Appropriations
Act, the European Community (EC) was allowed to bring a complaint against
the USA for certain provisions in the US intellectual property legislation which
48) US statement at a meeting on 7 May 2003 in which it presented its reactions to the decision in
paragraph 6.10 by the Arbitrators in WT/DS108/ARB (US–Foreign Sales Corporations), <www.us-mission.
ch/press2003/0507DSB.html>, visited on 2 June 2006.
49) On the distinction between lawmaking and contractual treaties, see Wolfrum and Matz, supra note 5,
pp. 131–133.
50) WT/DS27/AB/R (EC–Bananas), para. 136.
51) Ibid., para. 133. Pauwelyn, supra note 8, pp. 81–85, ﬁnds that the term ‘legal interest’ as applied
by the Appellate Body, is not adequately precise. Rather, he establishes two conditions for legal standing
to be established. First, in the context of WTO, addressing trade-restricting measures inconsistent with
one or more of the WTO agreements, the trade of a particular WTO member State must–at least in the-
ory–apply to the trade of the member bringing the case. Second, the State must prove that it is–
potentially–affected by the measure, directly through trade or otherwise, including the effects of
increased prices on the world market (trade opportunities, not trade effects). Therefore, as these two con-
ditions must be met, a “purely ‘legal interest’ is not enough” in order for standing to be established.
Pauwelyn, supra note 8, p. 83, footnote omitted.
52) WT/DS202/AB/R, paras. 120–133.
NORD_76-4-04-Haugen  11/14/07  8:24 PM  Page 450
Haugen / Nordic Journal of International Law 76 (2007) 435–464 451
were discriminatory against Cuban citizens.53 The EC was not directly affected
by this legislation, but the USA did not object to the fact that the EC made its
claims before the WTO dispute settlement system, and subsequently won the
case.54
These three examples illustrate that a State which does not have any speciﬁc
economic interest can also bring a case before the WTO’s dispute settlement sys-
tem. An explanation is that the defending parties have not presented objections
to the fact that the case is brought by States other than the directly-affected State.
Moreover, the dispute settlement system seems to consider that these cases
address certain issues which are found to be of importance for the WTO as
such to clarify–and confirm–certain principles of favourable treatment and
discrimination.
An additional interpretative material relevant to the dispute settlement system
will be included. GATT 1994 Article XXIII:1 on ‘nulliﬁcation or impairment’
reads:
If any contracting party should consider that any beneﬁt accruing to it directly or indi-
rectly under this Agreement is being nulliﬁed or impaired or that the attainment of any
objective of the Agreement is being impeded. . . .55
Hence, the legal interests extend to whether the attainment of the objective is being
impeded. This indicates a strong legal interest in compliance with the obligations.
Moreover, while TRIPS is setting out minimum standards for the protection
of trade-related intellectual property, TRIPS is a standard-setting agreement.
Implementation of TRIPS in accordance with its provisions is an obligation of
all WTO member States. There are different positions with regard to the desir-
ability of introducing the same standards in industrialised and developing States,
but WTO member States have a legal interest in other States’ compliance with
the TRIPS requirements.
Does this qualify for establishing obligations erga omnes? The three require-
ments introduced at the introduction of this section (violates its legal obligations;
grave and systematic manner; serious consequences) imply that there are certain
requirements for establishing obligations erga omnes. Moreover, the legal interests
must be claimed by all States. Those States which are not parties to the WTO
53) WT/DS176/AB/R, paras. 273–296.
54) As an argument against this reasoning, Pauwelyn, supra note 8, p. 85, holds that this “would only
mean that WTO members can, in certain circumstances, exercise the rights of other members, not that
breach of any WTO rule by any WTO member creates an individual right for each and every other WTO
member.”
55) Emphasis added. Parts of Article XXIII are controversial, in particular Article XXIII:1(b) on non-
violation, implying that a WTO member State can also bring a case before the dispute settlement sys-
tem also if there has been no direct violation of any of the speciﬁc provisions.
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cannot generally be claimed to have so strong legal interests in a State’s compli-
ance with the TRIPS obligations that this establishes obligations on the level of
erga omnes.56
Therefore, while it must be emphasised that also State parties which are not
directly affected by the trading practice in another State can bring this trading
practice before the WTO’s dispute settlement system, it is not found that this con-
stitutes legal interests of a kind which imply that obligations erga omnes are estab-
lished.57 At the same time, the WTO constitutes more than merely ‘contractual
treaties’. Moreover, while there are usually only two parties to a WTO dispute, the
nature of the dispute is not ‘fundamentally bilateral’ as claimed by the USA.
4.4. The Legal Effects of Identifying Obligations Erga Omnes
While obligations erga omnes imply that other States have a legal interest in a
State’s compliance with its obligations, it must initially be stated that obligations
erga omnes are ﬁrst and foremost of a procedural nature to determine when other
States have legal interests in one State’s compliance.58 Barcelona Traction intro-
duced an essential distinction between obligations of a State toward the interna-
tional community as a whole, and obligations arising vis-à-vis another State in
the ﬁeld of diplomatic protection. In the latter case, a State must ﬁrst establish its
right to bring a claim against another State.59
To determine the legal effects, one must start from this basic understanding.
Based on obligations arising from the right to food in a situation where the State
bears a substantial responsibility for a situation with a high number of starving
persons this can give rise to obligations erga omnes.
The ILC’s Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law has observed:
“[O]bligations erga omnes were more concerned with the scope of the application
of norms, rather than hierarchy.”60 Hence, the norms giving rise to obligations erga
omnes apply generally, and the States do not have to establish that they have a right
to bring a claim or complaint. Unlike jus cogens norms, which are substantive
56) Whether the other WTO members might have obligations erga omnes partes, see Report of the
International Law Commission, supra note 24, pp. 320, 321, is a question which will not be elaborated
further as obligations erga omnes partes are even more weakly founded in international law than obliga-
tions erga omnes.
57) Therefore, the fact that the WTO’s adjudicating bodies apply a broad approach to the question
of standing, as identiﬁed by Tams, supra note 2, p. 121, is not in itself enough to conclude that the WTO
Agreement gives rise to obligations erga omnes.
58) See Seiderman, supra note 36, p. 125: “Obligations erga omnes (. . .) are not themselves primary
or substantive rules of international law, but are rather obligations that give rise to certain legal conse-
quences, or secondary rules of international law.”
59) Barcelona Traction, supra note 32, p. 33, para. 34.
60) Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 39, p. 223, para. 488. See also Articles 33(1)
and 48 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
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norms with specific legal effects, the same effects do not apply to obligations
erga omnes.
The identiﬁcation that certain rights gives rise to obligations erga omnes does
not determine that the treaty in which these human rights are recognised must
always prevail over other treaties. However, in order to clarify the relationship
between a human rights treaty and a treaty which merely provides for bilateral
concessions between States (contractual treaties), the fact that the human rights
treaty gives rise to obligations erga omnes can be an element in the legal reason-
ing, as human rights norms do have a special status in international law.
5. The Approach of Multilateral Obligations
The approach of multilateral obligations has recently been introduced in the aca-
demic literature, as well as in the context of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State
Responsibility.61 Initially it must be noted that multilateral obligations is wider
and less established as a legal concept than obligations erga omnes. Multilateral
obligations imply that two or more parties to a treaty giving rise to such obligations
can not modify or otherwise change the treaty.62 Conversely, a treaty giving rise to
bilateral obligations can be modiﬁed as a result of an agreement between two or
more parties to the treaty.
This section will analyse whether the development and application of multi-
lateral obligations are relevant as a supplement to obligations erga omnes in iden-
tifying distinctions between human rights treaties and other treaties. Among
such other treaties, WTO agreements will in particular be analysed. Stated dif-
ferently: Does an appropriate understanding of multilateral obligations imply
that human rights treaties give rise to multilateral obligations, and hence shall be
given particular weight?
An author addressing obligations arising under WTO law and human rights
law claims: “The standard example of [multilateral] obligations are those arising
under a human rights treaty [whereas] . . . WTO obligations remain essentially of
61) See in particular Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 40, ch. IV. See also
C. Tomuschat, ‘Obligations for States’, 241 Recueil des cours (1993–IV) (Hague Academy of
International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, Boston, London, 1994); J. A. Frowein,
‘Reactions by Not Directly Affected States’, 248 Recueil des cours (1994 –IV) (Hague Academy of
International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, Boston, London, 1995); Simma, supra note
3; and Pauwelyn, supra note 8, ch. 2.
62) S. Kirchner, ‘Relative Normativity and the Constitutional Dimension of International Law: A
Place for Values in the International Legal System?’, 5 German Law Journal (2004) p. 59. Although he
applies the terms ‘constitutional’ and ‘non-constitutional’, it is obvious that the legal effects are similar.
Other terms applied are ‘lawmaking’ and ‘contractual’. Initially, it must be emphasised that this analysis
is dealing with multilateral obligations, not multilateral treaties.
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a bilateral type; they are not collective in nature.”63 An alternative position is that
a standard-setting treaty such as TRIPS is of a more collective nature. The WTO
is analysed at the end of this section, but ﬁrst there is a need to give more clarity
to the concept and its application.
5.1. The Concept
The concept of multilateral obligations is not an established legal concept.64
Furthermore, it is important to note that the attempt to introduce a distinction
between treaty obligations of a reciprocal, interdependent and integral nature65 in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties did not succeed. Therefore, with
the exception of jus cogens norms, no hierarchy exists. The fact that this categori-
sation was not subequently proposed by the ILC implies that there exist reasons
to be cautious about introducing new concepts which could be understood as an
introduction of a new hierarchy in international law.
63) Pauwelyn, ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or
Collective in Nature?’, 14 European Journal of International Law (2003) p. 907, see also pp. 930–936, in
which he ﬁrst identiﬁes four reasons why WTO obligations should be considered bilateral obligations:
trade as the object for negotiations; WTO is dominated by a bilateral approach, which is later ‘multilat-
eralised’ and ‘collectivised’; the objective of WTO obligations can be individualised and reduced to the
relation between two States; and only the complainant State is allowed to suspend its obligations vis-à-
vis the State which has been found to be in non-compliance with WTO obligations. He also (at
pp. 936–941) ﬁnds three reasons in support of a development toward considering at least some WTO
obligations as closer to ‘collective’ (multilateral) obligations. These are: increased emphasis on economic
interdependence; new themes, in which WTO obligations also extend to individuals, not only to States;
and the more regulatory nature of these new WTO treaties. Pauwelyn ﬁnds (at p. 945) that TRIPS, “of
all WTO obligations, is the most regulatory in type . . .”.
64) C. Dominicé, ‘The International Responsibility of States for Breach of Multilateral Obligations’,
10 European Journal of International Law (1999) p. 354.
65) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 2 (1958) pp. 27, 28. The discussion contin-
ued in the ILC until their ﬁnal draft was adopted in 1966. In the Commentary to Article 30 of the ﬁnal
draft (then Article 26), the ILC stated: “[N]one of the forms of clause asserting the priority of a partic-
ular treaty over other treaties requires to be dealt with specially in the Article except Article 103 of the
Charter. It considered that the real issue, which does not depend on the presence or absence of such a
clause, is whether the conclusion of a treaty providing for obligations of an ‘interdependent’ or ‘integral’ char-
acter affects the actual capacity of each party unilaterally to enter into a later treaty derogating from these obli-
gations or leaves the matter as one of international responsibility for breach of the treaty.” (The ILC preferred
the latter option.) See Yearbook of International Law Commission, supra note 30, p. 216, para. 8, empha-
sis added. In a footnote, the definitions provided by Fitzmaurice were spelled out with examples:
Interdependent treaties are treaties in which “the violation of its obligations by one party prejudices the
treaty regime applicable between them all and not merely the relations between the defaulting State and
the other parties.” Integral treaties were defined as treaties in which the “obligation is self-evident,
absolute and inherent for each party, and not depending on a corresponding performance by the others” and
include ‘human rights conventions’. See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 2 (1958)
pp. 27, 28, emphasis added. See also Yearbook of the International Law Commission, supra note 30, p. 217,
para. 13, considering human rights as a ‘vital matter’. Also in 1963 and 1964, the ILC dealt with inter-
dependent and integral treaties, see Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 2 (1963) p. 39,
para. 17, and Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 2 (1964) pp. 58–60, paras. 22–30.
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No substantial efforts have been made to clarify the distinction between mul-
tilateral obligations and obligations erga omnes, and between multilateral obliga-
tions and the ‘international crimes of States’, as introduced and deﬁned in the
Draft Articles on State Responsibility.66 Such uncertainty regarding the scope of
the concept of multilateral obligations should, however, not prevent one from
analysing obligations imposed by human rights treaties versus obligations
imposed by economic law treaties.
Moreover, the term ‘multilateral obligations’ is distinct from obligations erga
omnes as the latter must be narrowly understood, while the former has a wider
application.67 The ILC, however, has not presented a deﬁnition distinguishing
multilateral obligations clearly from obligations erga omnes.68
5.2. The ILC’s Distinctions
There are three processes within the International Law Commission which will
be analysed in order to reach a better understanding of the term ‘multilateral
obligations’: the elaboration on the law of treaties; the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility; and the elaboration on fragmentation of international law.
An attempt at distinguishing between international law treaties was made in
Fitzmaurice’s report to the ILC in 1958, elaborating on three proposed categories
of treaties, categorised by the nature of their obligations: integral treaties, inter-
dependent treaties and reciprocal treaties.69
Regarding treaties of the integral type, “the force of the obligation is self-evident,
absolute and inherent for each party, and not depending on a corresponding
66) A link between obligations erga omnes and State responsibility is made in Report of the
International Law Commission, supra note 39, p. 225, para. 492: “[O]bligations erga omnes [are] related
to the opposability of the obligations to all States, in particular the right of every State to invoke their vio-
lation as a basis for State responsibility”, emphasis added. Simma, supra note 3, p. 309, discussing the term
‘international crimes of States’, ﬁnds that the introduction of this term has led to confusion in relation
to the more established concepts of jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes.
67) The present author ﬁnds that the main difference between obligations erga omnes and multilateral
obligations is that the former strictly apply to the internal jurisdiction of the State, while the latter have a
stronger external dimension. Moreover, multilateral obligations must be considered to be more enduring
obligations not only relating to particularly serious incidents, while the establishment of obligations erga
omnes are identiﬁed by balancing various provisions of the relevant treaties. Furthermore, no court ruling
is necessary in order to establish this obligation. Unlike obligations erga omnes, the distinction between
bilateral and multilateral obligations is not recognised as a codiﬁed rule of international law.
68) Within the context of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the ILC (supra note 40, pp. 42,
43) distinguished between the “State injured by an internationally wrongful act of another State and (. . .)
the State which had a legal interest in the performance of an international obligation without being
directly injured . . .”. This latter is an understanding which is almost identical to obligations erga omnes.
See also Article 48 (‘invocation of responsibility by a State other than an injured State’) of Part III (‘imple-
mentation of the international responsibility of a State’) of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
Article 33(1) of Part II (‘content of the international responsibility of a State’).
69) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, supra note 65, pp. 27, 28.
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performance by the others.”70 The Convention Against Genocide is one example.
Treaties with interdependent obligations are treaties in which the breach of one of
the treaty obligations by one party “will justify a corresponding non-performance”
by the other parties.71 Disarmament treaties give rise to such interdependent
obligations. Treaties with reciprocal obligations are of the kind that only affect
the relationship of the parties to a treaty. Treaties regulating bilateral diplomatic
relations are one example. These distinctions were not proposed in later ILC
drafts on the law of treaties.
The second relevant process is the drafting of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility. While the Draft Articles themselves do not explicitly use the
term ‘multilateral obligations’, the report by the Special Rapporteur introduced
the distinction between multilateral and bilateral obligations.72 The subsequent
discussion emphasised Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (‘termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence
of its breach’).
Treaties where “performance of the obligations of a treaty is owed to the parties
to the treaty”73 stand out from other treaties. Moreover, “[i]t will be a matter for
the interpretation and application of the primary rule to determine into which of
the categories an obligation comes.”74 The term ‘multilateral obligations’ encom-
passes hence both integral and interdependent obligations.
Human rights treaties are not addressed in this context. Human rights,
however, are recognised in another provision of the ILC’s Draft Articles on
State Responsibility. The obligations recognised under Article 50(1) (‘obligations
not affected by countermeasures’)–of which fundamental human rights
obligations are part–must be considered to be multilateral obligations of an inte-
gral nature.75
Third, the ILC has recently also applied the term ‘absolute obligations’ in the
context of human rights,76 in a study on Article 41 on the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (‘agreements to modify multilateral treaties by certain of
the parties only’). A distinction is made between treaties laying down reciprocal
70) Ibid., p. 28, emphasis added.
71) Ibid., p. 27, emphasis added.
72) See Report by ILC Special Rapporteur James Crawford, supra note 33, paras. 99–108.
73) Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 24, p. 297.
74) Ibid.
75) Article 50(1) prohibits the taking of countermeasures affecting: a) obligations to refrain from the
use of force; b) obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights; c) obligations of a human-
itarian character prohibiting reprisals; d) other obligations under pre-emptory norms under general
international law. See ibid.
76) Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-sixth Session (3 May–4 June and 5 July–6 August
2004), UN Doc. A/59/10, 2004, p. 297, footnote 640, which reads: “A human rights treaty gives rise to
absolute obligations. The obligations it imposes are independent and absolute and performance of them
in indedependent of the performance by the other parties of their performance.”
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obligations, which can be modiﬁed, and treaties containing interdependent or
absolute obligations, under which the “power of modiﬁcation is limited.”77
This demonstrates that the distinction between treaties based on their character
still has some resonnance in the International Law Commission. Treaties which
give rise to multilateral obligations–owed to the other parties to a treaty–are seen
as being of a special nature. At the same time, there is no basis for claiming that
the International Law Commission has made any deliberate efforts to clarify the
term ‘multilateral obligations’.
Moreover, there is no consistent application of terms in the three processes
involving the ILC. One general principle can be derived from the reports
analysed: members of the ILC still ﬁnds that a distinction can be made between
integral and interdependent obligations on the one hand, and reciprocal obliga-
tions on the other. While the two former are similar to multilateral obligations,
the latter must be considered to be obligations of a bilateral kind.
5.3. Distinction Made in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
To which extent the Vienna Convention identifies certain treaty obligations
which stand out from other treaty obligations, in addition to the jus cogens norms
of Articles 53 and 64, will now analysed.
There is one provision which is a remnant from the category of interdepend-
ent treaties. This is Article 60(2)(c), relating to performance of obligations:
If the treaty is of such a character that a material breach of its provisions by one party
radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of
its obligations under the treaty.
This provision emphasises the performance of obligations under the treaty, hence
relating to interdependent obligations. As already shown, disarmament treaties
gives rise to such obligations. As this does not establish the basis for distinguish-
ing treaties, this paragraph will not be analysed further.
Article 60 includes another paragraph which can be considered as conﬁrming
that there are certain obligations relating to the protection of the human beings,
in addition to jus cogens norms, which stands out from the other paragraphs.
This is Article 60(5) on the protection of the human person.78 This paragraph
77) Ibid.
78) It is evident that treaties of a humanitarian character stand out from other treaties. In Reservations
to the Genocide Convention, the representative from the United Kingdom made one of the strongest argu-
ments before the International Court of Justice that there is a difference between treaties of a social and
lawmaking type on the one hand, and treaties providing for the exchange of reciprocal beneﬁts and obli-
gations on the other. See ICJ Reports 1951, pp. 378–383. In a separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry
in Application of the Genocide Convention, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 640, the humanitarian and human rights
treaties are held to be distinguished from other treaties regulating particular interests of the States. See in
particular pp. 645, 646. See also Kirchner, supra note 62, p. 59: “Human rights treaties have arguably
reached a status which elevates them over other treaties . . .”
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recognises that certain provisions in international treaties are different from
other provisions:
Paragraphs 1 to 3 [regarding termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a
consequence of its breach] do not apply to provisions relating to the protection of the
human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provi-
sions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by such treaties.
Human rights treaties must be considered to belong to this category of treaties.79
While the Vienna Convention does not explicitly state that these two paragraphs
entail multilateral obligations, it is at least evident that these two paragraphs
stand out from other paragraphs. Article 60(5) will be analysed with the purpose
of identifying the legal effects–if any–of applying this paragraph.
The most important legal consequence of Article 60(5) is that treaties of a
humanitarian character cannot be terminated or suspended simply because of a
material breach of the treaty.
It must also be asked whether Article 60(5) provides guidance regarding which
material breaches of a treaty cannot be accepted. Initially, it seems that Article 60(5)
as such does not provide such guidance. Article 50(1) of the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility explicitly states that ‘fundamental human rights obligations’
shall not be affected by countermeasures taken by an injured State against a State
responsible for an internationally wrongful act.80 Hence, no State should be
involved in any activities which affect another State’s obligations imposed by fun-
damental human rights.
Article 60(5) in itself does not say that humanitarian treaties are to prevail over
other international treaties, and does not help in solving speciﬁc conﬂicts between
humanitarian treaties and other treaties.
At the same time, however, if Article 60(5) is applied in order to clarify a treaty
provision in a situation with conﬂicting treaties, it will most likely be done in
order to indicate that the treaty relating to the protection of a human person
must prevail over the other treaty. Article 60(5) strictly states that the treaties
shall continue to apply irrespective of any material breach of any provisions of
this treaty. Even if Article 60(5) does not provide much help in identifying the
79) This is conﬁrmed by the Swiss delegation, which not only referred to the Geneva Conventions,
but also to “conventions of equal importance” including the “protection of human rights in general.” See
UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vol. I: First Session, Vienna, 26 March–24 May 1968, Official
Records, p. 354, para. 12. The Swiss delegation stated that “even a material breach of those conventions
by a party should not be allowed to injure innocent people.” Their proposal was later presented to the
plenary as document A/CONF.39/L.31, UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vol. III: First and Second
Sessions, Vienna, 26 March–24 May 1968 and 9 April–22 May 1969, Ofﬁcial Records, p. 269. In the vot-
ing, this proposal–presented as a ‘principle’–was included in Article 60 with 87 votes to none, and
9 abstentions. See UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, supra note 20, p. 115.
80) Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 24.
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precise nature of obligations in humanitarian treaties, the scope of Article 60(5)
also includes human rights treaties.
5.4. Distinctions Made by Legal Authors
There are several authors who have attempted to deﬁne the concept of multilat-
eral obligations. One deﬁnition is proposed by an author who has been active in
setting the agenda for the discussion on the relationship between WTO law and
general international law. He ﬁnds that the distinctive element is that breaches
of multilateral obligations, unlike bilateral obligations, “affect the rights or obli-
gations of all other states bound by the rule concerned. If so, the obligation is of
the multilateral/integral nature.”81
Hence, the author understands multilateral and integral obligations to be more
or less the same. His focus is on how breaches by one State ‘affects the obligations
of all other States’. While this is a legitimate concern, the consequences he identiﬁes
of such a breach (‘affects the obligations’) are similar to interdependent obligations.
The breach of integral obligations, on the other hand, concerns all other States, and
the obligations do not depend on a corresponding performance by the others.
Other authors emphasise that the collective interest in upholding multilateral
obligations is that a State’s breach of an obligation affects the performance of the
treaty.82 This emphasis on ‘performance’ implies that such multilateral obliga-
tions arguably come closer to what was understood as interdependent obligations
by Fitzmaurice in his 1958 report, in which a violation of obligations by one
party prejudices the treaty regime applicable between them all.
Another deﬁnition of multilateral obligations which does not emphasise the
aspect of performance of a particular legal regime, but rather stresses the widely
held interests of the community of States declares: “[A] multilateral obligation is
an absolute obligation in customary international law which is binding upon all
states in their mutual relations, and that a breach of such an obligation concerns
all other states.”83 This deﬁnition comes closer to the deﬁnition of treaties with
integral obligations.
Simply stated, a distinction can be made between a wide deﬁnition (empha-
sising treaty performance) and a narrow deﬁnition (obligations are absolute, not
dependent upon treaty performance) of multilateral obligations. Both of these
obligations stand out from other obligations.
81) J. Pauwelyn, The Nature of WTO Obligations, Jean Monnet Working Papers No. 1/02 (Jean
Monnet Center, New York University School of Law, 2002) p. 13.
82) Frowein, supra note 61, p. 403. See also D.N. Hutchinson, ‘Solidarity and Breaches of
Multilateral Treaties’, 59 The British Yearbook of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1988) p. 153, stating that “parties to a multilateral treaty have a right to its performance . . .”.
83) Dominicé, supra note 64, p. 357. Under this deﬁnition, the term ‘multilateral obligations’ is close
to obligations erga omnes.
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Is it obvious that fundamental human rights must be recognised as imposing
multilateral obligations, understood in the narrow sense? The European Court of
Human Rights has confirmed such understanding, and this understanding is
generally not disputed.84 Moreover, the term ‘absolute obligations’ is more pre-
cise regarding human rights compared to the term ‘multilateral obligations’ as the
latter is wider and subject to different interpretations.85 It is important that a dis-
tinction is made between treaties where “obligation is self-evident, absolute and
inherent for each party, and not depending on a corresponding performance by
the others”86 (integral obligations of human rights treaties) and treaties in which
the “violation of its obligations by one party prejudices the treaty regime applica-
ble between them all”87 (interdependent obligations of disarmament treaties).
Finally, it must be identiﬁed whether the right to food is giving rise to the con-
cept of multilateral obligations. Section 3.2 analysed whether a distinction must
be made between different human rights in the context of obligations erga omnes.
This analysis is not directly applicable in the context of multilateral obligations.
A distinction must be made between obligations which are of legal interest for
the international community (obligations erga omnes), and obligations to which
there are restricted modiﬁcation possibilities (multilateral obligations). The con-
cept ‘multilateral obligations’ is not yet very clear. It will not be examined in
detail whether a wider category of norms fall under this concept compared to the
norms under which obligations erga omnes are derived.
With regard to human rights, however, the answer seems rather evident. As
human rights treaties have no provisions on amendments, there are no possibil-
ities of amending them–even if optional protocols can be adopted. This shows
that human rights in general fall under the category of multilateral obligations.
5.5. Distinction Between Different WTO Agreements
It was found in Section 3.3 above, based on three rulings analysed, as well as
GATT 1994 Article XXIII:1 on ‘nullification or impairment’, that the other
States than those directly affected can raise a dispute before the WTO dispute
84) See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1978, Series A, No. 25, p. 90, in which it stated “unlike interna-
tional treaties of the classic kind, the Convention [European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms] comprises more than reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It cre-
ates, over and above a network of mutual bilateral understandings . . .”.
85) For an elaboration of the non-consistent use of the terms introduced by Fitzmaurice in his 1958
report, supra note 65, made subsequently by the ILC, see Tams, supra note 2, p. 55.
86) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 2 (1958) pp. 27, 28. The State party’s perform-
ance of its obligations is crucial; therefore, two or more parties to a treaty giving rise to such obligations
cannot modify or otherwise change the treaty.
87) Ibid. This refers to performance of the treaty regime, not performance of its obligations by a
State party.
NORD_76-4-04-Haugen  11/14/07  8:24 PM  Page 460
Haugen / Nordic Journal of International Law 76 (2007) 435–464 461
settlement system. While it was not found that this was sufﬁcient to constitute
obligations erga omnes, the traditional view that international economic law
treaties constitute bilateral obligations only88 is not questioned.
Pauwelyn ﬁnds that the objective of trade is not of a kind which implies that
its obligations could be multilateral. He concludes that:
The way WTO obligations are enforced is exclusively bilateral. WTO dispute settlement
does not, in the ﬁrst place, tackle breach, but rather nulliﬁcation of beneﬁts that accrue to
a particular member. (. . .) Most importantly, in case the defendant loses and does not
comply within a reasonable period of time, the winning state will be authorised to
impose state-to-state countermeasures against the losing state (DSU Art. 22). This exclu-
sively bilateral modality of enforcement of WTO rules is an important indication that
most WTO obligations are reciprocal in nature.89
These observations might apply to the old GATT 1947, but ‘ignore’ the devel-
opments since the establishment of the WTO, including treaties such as TRIPS,
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure (SPS) and Techical Barrier to Trade (TBT)
which are not merely bilateral or reciprocal.
Based on these ﬁndings that WTO constitutes something more than merely
bilateral relationships, the thesis will now examine whether these treaties might
fall within the narrow concept of multilateral obligations–understood as integral
or absolute obligations–or if they rather fall within the wider concept of multi-
lateral obligations –understood as interdependent obligations.
The requirements for an obligation to fall within the narrow concept must be
considered to be relatively strict. Integral treaties were deﬁned as treaties in which
the “obligation is self-evident, absolute and inherent for each party, and not depend-
ing on a corresponding performance by the others.”90 Could the obligations arising
under TRIPS be considered to fall within the scope of this deﬁnition? In this con-
text, it must also be emphasised that when the ILC has referred to treaties contain-
ing such obligations, these treaties have been found to “protect vital matters.”91
Concerning the narrow understanding of multilateral obligations, while
TRIPS might contain obligations which are ‘self-evident, absolute and inherent’,
the instrumental nature of the rights protected by TRIPS is not of such a kind
that they can be regarded as ‘vital matters’.
It will now be clariﬁed whether WTO obligations fall within the scope of the
multilateral obligations (understood in the wide sense of interdependent obliga-
tions). Also here, the analysis will start from GATT 1994 Article XXIII:1 on
88) See Pauwelyn, supra note 81, pp. 12–31. See also Simma, supra note 3, pp. 364–366, and W. J. Ethier,
‘Intellectual Property Rights and Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization’, 7 Journal of
International Economic Law (2004) pp. 452, 453.
89) Ibid., p. 19.
90) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, supra note 65, pp. 27, 28, emphasis added.
91) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, supra note 30, p. 217, para. 13.
NORD_76-4-04-Haugen  11/14/07  8:24 PM  Page 461
462 Haugen / Nordic Journal of International Law 76 (2007) 435–464
‘nulliﬁcation or impairment’ which addresses situations where ‘the attainment of
any objective of the Agreement is being impeded’. This provision primarily relates to
a situation in which breaches of a treaty negatively affect the overall performance
of this treaty. Performance of a treaty constitutes a central element of multilateral
obligations (understood in the wide sense of interdependent obligations).92
This indicates that WTO obligations might fall within the scope of multilateral
obligations. This is further conﬁrmed by TRIPS, which contains provisions on
minimum standards for intellectual property protection,93 and where the lack of
observance of these standards by one or more States might affect the overall
performance of TRIPS.
Therefore, the particular nature of some WTO agreements must be considered
to constitute something more than just contractual obligations of a reciprocal
nature.
5.6. Legal Consequences of Establishing Multilateral Obligations
The legal consequences of determining that a treaty establishes multilateral obli-
gations is that the treaty cannot be amended by some of the parties (inter se agree-
ment). In general, most multilateral treaties are very difficult to amend.
Regarding those treaties analysed in this thesis, the Covenant and TRIPS, the lat-
ter provides for amendment, and has already been amended in accordance with
the 30 August 2003 decision and the 6 December 2005 decision.94 There have
not been attempts at amending the text of human rights treaties, but the scope
of these treaties has been extended by the adoption of optional protocols. With
regard to the Covenant, the only amendment that is foreseeable is the adoption
of an optional protocol.
Hence, a distinction can be drawn between human rights treaties on the one
hand and WTO agreements on the other. This distinction should not be overem-
phasised, however. Minor amendments of TRIPS are likely,95 but not amend-
ments relating to issues such as patenability and exclusive rights.
Are there other distinctions that can be introduced in order to justify a
claim that human rights treaties are of a different nature than intellectual prop-
erty rights?
92) See the deﬁnitions given by Pauwelyn, supra note 81, p. 13, and Frowein, supra note 61, p. 403,
emphasising that a breach of a treaty affects the obligations of other States or the performance of the treaty.
93) F. Roessler (former director of the WTO Legal Division), ‘Diverging Domestic Policies and
Multilateral Trade Regulations’, in R. Hudec and J. Bhagwati (eds.), Free Trade and Harmonization:
Prerequisites for Free Trade, Vol. 2: Legal Analysis (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996) p. 42,
states that TRIPS is the only agreement annexed to the WTO Agreement that “establishes positive stan-
dards for the conduct of domestic policies.”
94) WT/L/540 and WT/L/641, respectively.
95) Articles 27(3)(b) and 71(1) of TRIPS explicitly allow for review or amendments of the treaty.
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First, the introduction of terms such as ‘law-making’96 and ‘constitutional’97
emphasise that human rights treaties contain more important norms than other
treaties. This is also emphasised by the Commission on Intellectual Property,
which states that intellectual property is a “means by which nations and societies
can help to promote the fulﬁlment of human economic and social rights.”98
Second, the very restricted possibilities for limitation of the human rights
must be noted. Article 4 of the Covenant establishes three requirements for lim-
iting the recognised human rights (based on law; compatible with the nature of
the rights; only for the promotion of general welfare). On the other hand, TRIPS
provides for several possibilities for the limitations of the rights, in addition to
‘exclusion from patentability’ as found in Article 27(2). Articles 30 (limited
exceptions), 31 (other use) and 32 (revocation/forfeiture) all allow for the limi-
tation of the exclusive rights, but all of these provisions are to be applied accord-
ing to strict criteria. Therefore, in principle, there are more restricted possibilities
for limiting the enjoyment of human rights compared with the possibilities that
exists under patent rights.
At the same time, the patent right holder has wide opportunities to ensure the
exercise of his rights by enforcing the rights by means of pursuasion or through
the courts. Similar opportunities are not available for those who are not able to
fully exercise their human rights.
Therefore, the understanding that human rights constitute multilateral obli-
gations in the narow sense (integral or absolute obligations) is not the only basis
for stating that human rights treaties are of such important value that they must
be given certain weight. The particular nature of these treaties and the restricted
possibilities for limitations must also be observed. This could imply that human
rights treaties might be elevated above treaties regulating matters of a more
instrumental nature.
As the deﬁnition of ‘multilateral obligations’ is still unresolved, it is difﬁcult to
make use of this legal concept as a basis for distinguishing between treaties. It is
found, however, that human rights treaties fall within the narrow deﬁnition of
multilateral obligations, while TRIPS falls within the broad deﬁnition of multi-
lateral obligations. At the same time, there are obligations under TRIPS indicat-
ing that they have an integral or absolute character, implying that the obligation
96) Wolfrum and Matz, supra note 5, pp. 131–133.
97) Kirchner, supra note 62, p. 59.
98) Commission on Intellectual Property, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy
(UK Department for International Development, London, 2002) p. 6. Here, the Commission also ﬁnds
the following: “In particular, there are no circumstances in which the most fundamental human rights
should be subordinated to the requirements of IP protection. IP rights are granted by states for limited
times (at least in the case of patents and copyrights) whereas human rights are inalienable and universal.”
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is ‘self-evident, absolute and inherent, which includes also some of the enforce-
ment provisions of Part III of TRIPS.’
Therefore, a distinction must be made between those WTO agreements which
establish procedures for the liberalisation of trade without establishing substan-
tive standards, and those WTO agreements which establish substantive provi-
sions that allow individuals to exercise exclusive rights.
Moreover, with regard to human rights, rather than concluding deﬁnitively
based on an unresolved deﬁnitional question it is more appropriate to emphasise
the nature of human rights and the values such treaties seek to protect. This will
also highlight the differences between treaties regulating human rights and
treaties regulating intellectual property rights.
6. The Weight of Human Rights Obligations in International Economic
Law Interpretation
This analysis has found that there are differences between the two treaties with
regard to the recognised rights to be protected, with the Covenant imposing obliga-
tions to which all other States have a legal interest, setting out absolute obligations,99
and with very limited possibilities for limitating the enjoyment of the rights. It is
generally accepted that the WTO primarily regulates reciprocal relationships.
Increasingly, there is also a recognition that the WTO establishes obligations to
which other States than the allegedly affected State have legal interests in ensuring
compliance as the performance of the treaty is crucial. Moreover, many WTO
agreements are actually standard-setting, and are not likely to be amended.
Human rights obligations are of a particular importance in international law.
The nature of these treaties implies that they have a certain weight. Certain
human rights that individuals should enjoy are more basic or fundamental as
they affect the physical integrity of the human being. To have the enjoyment of
these human rights restricted in a systematic manner–both through acts of omis-
sion and acts of commission–can lead to grave human rights situations.
99) Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 76, p. 297, footnote 640.
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